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Abstract. In this analysis of domestic historiography of the 1917 Revolution 
in Russia, the author highlights the importance of mass popular protests in 
understanding the causes of this crucial event, while noting that this factor 
has been unreasonably neglected by Russian historians since the early 
1990s. She argues that both the character of the revolution and the chances 
for a peaceful settlement of conflicts in Russian society depended on the 
policy of top state authorities, especially from 1916 forward.  
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УСПЕХИ И ПРОСЧЁТЫ  
В ИЗУЧЕНИИ РЕВОЛЮЦИИ 1917 ГОДА В РОССИИ 
 
Ирина М. Пушкарёва 
Институт российской истории РАН 
 
Аннотация. Анализируя особенности изучения революции 1917 г. в 
России в основном в отечественной историографии, автор акцентирует 
важность изучения массового протестного движения для понимания 
причин революционного взрыва. Данное направление исследований 
было необоснованно отодвинуто в тень с начала 1990-х гг. При этом 
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подчеркивается, что как характер революции, так и возможность 
разрешить противоречия нереволюционным путём были обусловлены 
политикой высшей государственной власти, особенно начиная с 1916 г.  
 
Ключевые слова: революция 1917 г., Россия, историография, массовое 
протестное движение, рабочий класс. 
 
 
The centenary of the revolution of 1917 naturally caused an increased 
interest in the event, as well as an avalanche of literature on the subject. 
Scholars have summarized the preliminary results of such studies, with 
special attention paid to the preconditions for the revolution. New works in 
domestic and foreign historiography make it possible to compare aspects of 
the internal situation that emerged during the First World War in Russia to 
other belligerent countries: the state of the public sector of the economy, the 
processes conditioned by socioeconomic government policies, and the 
polarization of government and society (see e.g. Petrov 2017). It should be 
noted here that there is a discrepancy in the interpretation of the concept of 
“society,” which cannot be ignored from the scholarly viewpoint in explaining 
the causes of the revolution. Sometimes the term refers solely to educated 
and wealthy people, including financial and banking tycoons. In this 
interpretation, “society” means “educated society.” However, early twentieth-
century Russian encyclopedias indicate that the concept of “society” 
included ordinary people as well. 
Unquestionably, it is necessary to look for the deep-seated causes of 
Russian revolutions in the success of Russian modernization, with the 
attendant difficulties of the transition from a traditional to an industrial 
society. Yet people as active participants in the social process tend to get 
lost in such conversations nowadays. Today many Russian historians 
believe that the “impetus” to the “fatal revolutionary explosion” was an 
“explosive mixture of militant nationalism, xenophobia and spy mania” (see 
e.g. Kolonitskii 2010). Without denying the widespread influence of these 
phenomena in Russian social life, it must be noted, however, that under the 
conditions of a protracted war, by 1917 it is hardly possible to confine 
oneself to these factors when speaking about the causes of the revolution. 
The authors of recent works somehow overlook the fact that the driving 
force that led to the revolutionary explosion was the intensification of mass 
popular protest. Contemporaries, who were especially apprehensive of such 
an explosion, noted the growth of revolutionary sentiments among the 
masses, which fueled these protests. What form the revolution would take, 
whether social or political, and the question of whether it could be avoided 
altogether in February 1917, depended entirely on the top state leadership 
and its policies, particularly beginning in 1916. N. Berdyaev offers a wise 
comment on this situation: “The revolution always claims that the 
authorities did not fulfill their duties” (1990 [1923]). 
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The main driving force leading to a potential explosion under the 
prevailing circumstances was the proletariat, whose mass protests reached 
unprecedented proportions in this period. Between July 1914 and February 
28, 1917, over 5,000 strikes took place in Russia, in which more than 3 
million workers took part. Low wages fueled the 70 percent increase in 
economic strikes in 1916; their number increased 14 times in this year 
compared to 1915. The peak in political strikes occurred in 1916 and early 
1917. Since the 1990s, these facts have been largely ignored in the literature 
on the 1917 Revolution. 
The collapse of the USSR compromised the history of mass protest 
movements, along with the history of the Russian Social Democratic Labor 
Party /Communist Party of the Soviet Union. This accelerated the 
relativization of analytical results achieved in this field by domestic social 
science research. The very principles of mass character, solidarity, and 
collectivity in history were rejected. The antiwar component of the protest 
movement and the unpopular policies of the imperial government were 
forgotten. Like a shrinking violet, the history of mass popular protest in 
Russia on the eve of 1917 not only gave way to other important problems of 
social history, but also to vague innuendos and sensationalism. 
B. N. Mironov has pointed to the sufficient standard of living in the 
Russian Empire in the early twentieth century as part of this discussion, 
questioning the need to include this factor as one of the catalysts for the 
mass movement that led to the fall of the monarchy. He writes, “the fall of 
tsarism was not so much the result of a spontaneous movement from below, 
but rather the result of a revolution from above,” (Mironov 2010, 665); a lot 
of historians are inclined to think likewise. Scholars are right to argue that 
“‘simple’ conspiracy answers are not enough to explain the causes of the 
Great Russian Revolution, and perhaps we are still far from answering the 
question of how its trigger mechanism worked” (Petrov, 2017). Even so, 
when analyzing the revolution, it is necessary to consider the particular 
historical conditions of that period in Russian history, with all its 
characteristics, including the forgotten theme of wealth and poverty, without 
exception. 
Historiography (still Soviet!) long ago overcame the Leninist thesis of the 
“pauperization of masses.” Nevertheless, in representing the revolution as a 
“triumph of the revolting masses,” is it accurate to discount the extreme 
level of labor exploitation in agriculture and industry that existed in Russia 
during the war in comparison to other warring countries? Fifteen million 
employable individuals were mobilized during the First World War, while the 
goals of the war were not understood by the broad masses of the people, 
especially in the face of a growing gap between the wealthy and the poor. 
Despite the considerable amount of capital invested in Russian industry 
in the early twentieth century before the war and the subsequent doubling 
of its value, the economic impact was negligible. For example, even 
contemporaries noted that grain, the main agricultural product, increased 
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by a mere 1.7 percent, even as the population increased by 21 percent. 
Capitalism in agriculture did not eliminate “oppression, exploitation, poverty 
of the masses,” but created “these same disasters in a new form.” Due to 
that fact, monopolist landowners made fortunes of billions of rubles. During 
the war, this sort of robbery gained an exceptional scope. The imperial 
government needed money to continue the war and developed contacts with 
wealthy individuals who could provide it. This was accompanied by the 
violent suppression of the interests of the broad popular masses. Was it not 
for this reason that before the war millions of people in Russia were deprived 
of their suffrage so that they could not influence the decisions of the State 
Duma, which, among other things, asserted the costs of war? 
Representatives of the Russian state were indifferent to the millions of 
victims and the suffering of their compatriots, for whom the war was an 
unmitigated disaster. Their only concern was the fulfillment of their 
obligations to the Allies and the continuation of the war. 
The state sought to find effective ways to facilitate interaction with 
entrepreneurs to achieve a qualitative leap in weapons production. However, 
progress in this area was made due to the curtailment of civil production 
and the degradation of the private market that supplied goods to the urban 
and rural population. Wartime memoirs reveal the enormous profits that 
millionaires P. Riabushinskii, A. Konovalov, and other monopolistic 
industrialists received from military orders. What we would now call 
“stealing from the state” was unprecedented in Russia. The highest 
dignitaries and even Duma deputies were implicated in such affairs. The 
scale of abuse was so overwhelming that General A. Manikovskii 
sarcastically described the situation as “a crusade against the treasury 
chest” (1937, 84). 
The mass protest movement in Russia on the eve of 1917, as in 1905, 
was determined by such factors as the labor market, labor relations, and 
state policy, which, however archaic it may sound, spilled out into class 
conflict. Active mass popular protest had as its goal the protection of hired 
labor, a change in the balance of economic power between the protesters 
and the authorities, who were enriched at their expense. The huge social 
gap between the wealthy and the poor became especially noticeable during 
the period of the Provisional Government. Unlike a number of Western 
countries that managed to reach a compromise between labor and capital, 
it inherited from the tsarist government a bad system of military and 
economic regulation. As a result, it aroused distrust among the people, 
including among workers who belonged to non-revolutionary organizations. 
In conclusion, it should be noted that the unresolved relations between labor 
and capital are one of the key moments in the modernization of society. 
 
Translated from Russian by Alexander M. Amatov  
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